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Abstract
In this paper, we propose and study a first risk model in which the
insurer may invest into a prevention plan which decreases claim intensity.
We determine the optimal prevention investment for different risk indi-
cators. In particular, we show that the prevention amount minimizing
the ruin probability maximizes the adjustment coefficient in the classical
ruin model with prevention, as well as the expected dividends until ruin
in the model with dividends. We also show that the optimal prevention
strategy is different if one aims at maximizing the average surplus at a
fixed time horizon. A sensitivity analysis is carried out. We also prove
that our results can be extended to the case where prevention starts to
work only after a minimum prevention level threshold.
Keywords: Ruin theory; Prevention; Optimal prevention strategy; Insurance.
1 Introduction
An insurance company has several levers to manage risk and to optimize its
risk/return profile, including reinsurance, investment and dividends. Optimal
reinsurance strategies have been studied by Hesselager [Hes90], Højgaard et al.
[HT98] among others. Optimal investment strategies have been studied inde-
pendently from optimal reinsurance, or simultaneously like in Schmidli [Sch02].
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To better reflect the strategy of the insurer, a dividend barrier has been intro-
duced by De Finetti [DF57]. Optimal dividend strategy has become a classical
topic in ruin theory, see Avanzi [Ava09] for a survey. Another way to manage
risk is to update the pricing thanks to credibility techniques (see for example
Afonso et al. [AdRW10]). In this paper, we propose a new risk model that takes
into account the possibility for the insurer to carry out prevention plans, and
we determine optimal prevention strategies in ruin theory.
Prevention has become a key, trendy topic in insurance. In 1997, Discovery
was the first insurance company to implement an important prevention plan.
Since then, a growing number of insurers have launched their own programs
(e.g. John Hancock or OscarHealth in the USA, Generali Vitality or AXA
prevention in Europe). However, according to the OECD, prevention spendings
only represent 3% of the overall health expenditures in the world. Moreover,
this financial effort is mainly made by public authorities (e.g. 94% of preventive
spending is due to publics organism in the USA, 90% in Germany, 77% in the
United Kingdom and 64% in France). These low figures suggest that nowadays,
prevention is essentially a marketing tool for insurers.
In 1972, Ehrlich and Becker [EB72] proposed to separate two types of prevention:
self-protection and self-insurance. If one tried to adapt this work to our insur-
ance company, self-insurance would correspond to reinsurance. Self-protection
would consist in reducing claims frequency thanks to (costly) prevention plans.
Optimal self-protection strategies have not yet been studied in risk theory and
determining them is an interesting problem that differs from optimal reinsur-
ance, as we shall see in the sequel. In the sequel, the word‘”prevention” refers
to self-protection only.
In the present paper, we use the notation of Bowers et al. [BGH+84]. We
consider an insurance company with initial surplus U(0) = u. This company
receives premiums at a rate c per unit of time and invests a fixed amount p in
prevention per unit of time. Prevention strategies could be in theory dynamic
and depend on the history of the claim process. In practice prevention is a long
term strategy, therefore we assume in the present paper that it is defined from
the beginning and that it is not a control variable. The aggregate claim amount
up to time t is given by a compound Poisson process S(t) =
∑N(t)
i=1 Xi, where N
is a Poisson process of arrival intensity λ(p) and the (Xi)i∈N∗ are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, independent from N , and
with cumulative distribution function FX , such that E(X) = µ <∞.
We assume that λ(.) is a decreasing, strictly convex, positive, and C2 function
defined on [0, c]. Let us further comment these assumptions.
Choosing λ(.) positive means that one cannot prevent all risk. This hypothesis
is explained by the fact that if λ(.) could be equal to zero, it would allow some
arbitrage opportunity.
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Having λ(.) decreasing means that prevention always reduces the claim arrival
intensity. This is a classical economic hypothesis, done by Ehrlich and Becker
[EB72] or Dionne and Eeckhoudt [DE85] for example. However, a prevention
investment not ambitious enough could produce non significant effects. For
example, smoking 29 cigarettes a day instead of 30 cigarettes leads to almost
the same risk. Thus, this hypothesis is relaxed later on in this paper, by allowing
λ(.) to be first constant on some interval and then decreasing.
Assuming λ(.) strictly convex means that the more one spends in prevention, the
smaller the additional reduction of claims frequency is. This is also a common
economic hypothesis. This assumption has been made by Ehrlich and Becker
[EB72] and by Courbage [Cou01] among others.
It is also implicitly assumed that λ(.) does not change over time. This is quite a
strong hypothesis since in reality, there is no reason for prevention to be efficient
from the first moment you start implementing it. In this paper, we do not treat
this subject. Optimal control of prevention planning strategies in presence of
varying prevention efficiency is left for further research.
The surplus process is thus given by
U(t, p) = u+ (c− p)t−
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi. (1)
We denote by ϕ(u, p) = P(∀t ∈ R+, U(t) ≥ 0) the non-ruin probability in
infinite time (ψ(u, p) = 1 − ϕ(u, p) denoting the ruin probability). In order to
lighten formulas, we denote by ϕ′(u, p) = ∂ϕ(u,p)∂p when there is no ambiguity.
We have ϕ(u, p) > 0 if and only if the safety loading condition is verified, i.e.
1− λ(p)µ
c− p > 0. (2)
We suppose that Equation (2) holds true. Thus, we only consider p ∈ D =
[0, plim(1− ε)], with plim verifying 1− λ(plim)µc−plim = 0, and ε ∈ [0, 1[. The function
λ(.) being decreasing and continuous on [0, c], the intermediate value theorem
guarantees the existence of plim.
For this model, it is easy to extend several classical results of the classical
compound Poisson model. For u = 0, the non-ruin probability is given by
ϕ(0, p) = 1− λ(p)µ
c− p , (3)
and for all u, the non-ruin probability is given by the Pollaczeck-Khinchin for-
mula
ϕ(u, p) = ϕ(0, p)
∞∑
n=0
(1− ϕ(0, p))nF ∗ne,X(u), (4)
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where Fe,X designates the equilibrium cumulative distribution function given
by
Fe,X(u) =
∫ u
0 1− FX(x)dx
µ
. (5)
As mentioned earlier, the optimal prevention problem is different from the opti-
mal reinsurance one. Consider for example proportional reinsurance in the clas-
sical ruin model without prevention. If the insurer cedes a proportion α ∈ [0, 1]
of the claims with a reinsurance loading rate θ > 0, then its classical surplus
process
U(t) = u+ ct−
Nγ(t)∑
i=1
Xi (6)
where Nγ is a Poisson process with constant intensity γ becomes
U˜(t, α) = u+ (c− α(1 + θ)γµ)t− (1− α)
Nγ(t)∑
i=1
Xi. (7)
The ruin probability for the surplus process U˜(t, α) is the same as the one of
the process
V (t, α) = u1− α +
(c− α(1 + θ)γµ)
1− α t−
Nγ(t)∑
i=1
Xi. (8)
If one now considers an insurer using prevention but no reinsurance, then, thanks
to a time change, the ruin probability is similar to the one of the process
W (t, p) = u+ (c− p) γ
λ(p) t−
Nγ(t)∑
i=1
Xi. (9)
One can see that the initial surplus level remains homogeneous to the claim
amounts Xi’s in the prevention case (9), while it is divided by the retention rate
1 − α in the proportional reinsurance case (8). Another way to see easily that
the two problems are different is provided in Section 3.3.
The main contributions of this paper are to propose a first risk model with
prevention and to determine the optimal prevention investment for different
risk indicators. In particular, we show that the prevention amount minimizing
the ruin probability maximizes the adjustment coefficient in the classical ruin
model with prevention, as well as the expected dividends until ruin in the model
with dividends. We also show that the optimal prevention strategy is different
if one aims at maximizing the average surplus at a fixed time horizon. We carry
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out some sensitivity analysis of the optimal prevention investment level with
respect to the premium income rate on the one hand, and with respect to the
average claim size in the exponential case on the other hand. We also prove
that our results can be extended to the case where prevention starts to work
only after a minimum prevention level threshold.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, two optimal prevention amounts
are studied. More specifically, in Section 2.1, we discuss a prevention amount
which maximizes the non ruin probability, the adjustment coefficient and the ex-
pected dividends until ruin, while in Section 2.2, we study a prevention amount
maximizing the average surplus level on a given time horizon. In Section 3, we
relax the assumption on λ and tackle the case where it is first constant and then
decreasing. Some research perspectives are given in the conclusion.
2 Optimizing prevention strategies
An insurance company interested in prevention can pursue several purposes.
In this section are presented two optimal prevention strategies. The first one
consists in maximizing the non-ruin probability. Performing a time change in
the model as in (9) enables to highlight that maximizing the non-ruin probability
amounts to optimizing the premium rate. We show that the prevention amount
maximizing the non-ruin probability also maximizes the adjustment coefficient
and the expected dividend amount earned before ruin. That is why all these
optimal prevention amounts are discussed in the same section (i.e. in Section
2.1). The second one consists in maximizing the average surplus on a given time
horizon and is discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Non-ruin probability
A first goal for the insurer can be reducing its risk. In this section, we aim
to determine the prevention amount that maximizes the non-ruin probability
of the insurance company. We call it the “optimal prevention amount" in the
following.
Let
p∗ : R+ 7−→ R+
u 7−→ min(argmax
p∈D
(ϕ(u, p)))
be the function associating to an initial surplus u the prevention amount max-
imizing the non-ruin probability ϕ(u, p). Hence, p∗(u) represents the optimal
prevention amount when the initial surplus is equal to u.
The next proposition shows that the optimal prevention amount does not depend
on the value of the initial surplus, such that p∗(.) is actually constant. We
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denote by p∗0 the optimal prevention amount p∗(u) in the remaining of the paper.
Furthermore, the next result provides an equation which enables to determine
p∗0.
Proposition 1.
The optimal prevention amount p∗(u) does not depend on u.
Moreover, p∗0 is positive if and only if
−λ′(0)− λ(0)
c
> 0. (10)
In this case, we have
p∗0 = c+
λ(p∗0)
λ′(p∗0)
. (11)
Proof.
The proof is divided into two parts. In a first time, we find p∗0 maximizing the
function ϕ(0, .). In a second time, we show that p∗0 also maximizes the function
ϕ(u, .) for all u > 0.
From (3), we directly get
ϕ′(0, p) = −λ
′(p)µ
c− p −
λ(p)µ
(c− p)2 (12)
and
ϕ′′(0, p) = 2
c− pϕ
′(0, p)− λ
′′(p)µ
c− p . (13)
Hence, by Equation (13), thanks to the strict convexity of λ(.), we notice that
ϕ′(0, p) ≤ 0 implies ϕ′′(0, p) < 0 for all p ∈ R+.
Let us now prove that if ϕ′(0, 0) ≤ 0, then we have ϕ′(0, p) < 0 and ϕ′′(0, p) < 0
for all p > 0. We can restrict the prove to the case ϕ′(0, 0) < 0 since ϕ′(0, 0) = 0
implies ϕ′′(0, p) < 0 for small p > 0 which in turn implies that ϕ′(0, .) is a
decreasing function in a neighborhood of 0.
In that goal, let us define the interval I ⊂ R+ such that
• 0 ∈ I;
• ϕ′′(0, p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ I;
• If J = [a, b] ⊂ R+ such that 0 ∈ J and ϕ′′(0, p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ J , then
J ⊂ I.
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Then, if I = R+, we have proved the desired result. Otherwise, it means
that there would exist a > 0 such that I = [0, a]. But in that case, since
ϕ′′(0, .) is continuous, the intermediate value theorem tells us that we would
have ϕ′′(0, a) = 0. However, by definition, ϕ′′(0, .) is negative on the interval I
and so ϕ′(0, .) is decreasing on I. Now, since ϕ′(0, 0) < 0, we necessarily have
ϕ′(0, a) < 0 and hence ϕ′′(a) < 0 as shown previously, which contradicts the
result ϕ′′(0, a) = 0 that we would have if I = [0, a]. Finally, we necessarily have
I = R+.
In conclusion, if ϕ′(0, 0) ≤ 0 holds, ϕ(0, .) is a decreasing function meaning that
we should not spend money on prevention. On the contrary, if ϕ′(0, 0) > 0,
which is equivalent to the condition −λ′(0)− λ(0)c > 0, then ϕ(0, .) increases in
a neighborhood of 0, which means that prevention reduces the risk.
In such a situation, the optimal prevention amount is solution of ϕ′(0, p∗0) = 0.
From (12), we directly get
p∗0 = c+
λ(p∗0)
λ′(p∗0)
,
which is a maximum since ϕ′′(0, p∗0) < 0.
We now prove that the optimal prevention amount does not depend on u. Let
u ∈ R+ and p ∈ D, and let us denote by N∗ the Poisson process of arrival
intensity λ(p∗0). We now consider the two surplus processes
U(t, p) = u+ (c− p)t−
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi, (14)
with N a Poisson process of parameter λ(p) and
U(t, p∗0) = u+ (c− p∗0)t−
N∗(t)∑
i=1
Xi. (15)
It is well-known that changing the time scale (here multiplying the time by
λ(p∗0)/λ(p)) does not influence the infinite-time ruin probability, meaning that
ψ(u, p) = P(∃t such as U(t, p) < 0) = P(∃t such as U2(t, p) < 0), (16)
where the surplus process U2(t, p) is defined as
U2(t, p) = u+ (c− p)λ(p
∗
0)
λ(p) t−
N∗(t)∑
i=1
Xi. (17)
So, the only difference between the surplus processes U2(t, p) and U(t, p∗0) is the
drift. Thus, it comes ϕ(u, p) < ϕ(u, p∗0) if and only if (c − p)λ(p
∗
0)
λ(p) < (c − p∗0).
Now, it suffices to notice that
(c− p)λ(p
∗
0)
λ(p) − (c− p
∗
0) = µλ(p∗0)
[
c− p
λ(p)µ −
c− p∗0
λ(p∗0)µ
]
< 0 (18)
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since p∗0 minimizes ψ(0, p) =
(
c−p
λ(p)µ
)−1
, which completes the proof.
Notice that if there is no p∗0 in D such that ϕ′(0, p∗0) = 0, then the optimal
prevention amount is plim(1− ε) as ϕ(0, .) increases with p.
In Figure 2.1, we illustrate Proposition 1. We assume c = 10, λ(p) = 0,52 +
0,5e−p
2
and we consider claim amounts that are exponentially distributed with mean
µ = 10. We see that the optimal prevention amount is always the same whatever
the value taken by the initial surplus.
Figure 1: Non-ruin probabilities ϕ(0, p), ϕ(10, p) and ϕ(15, p) for c = 10, λ(p) =
0,5
2 +
0,5e−p
2 and claim amounts that are exponentially distributed with mean
µ = 10
From Proposition 1, we observe that maximizing ϕ(u, .) amounts to find p min-
imizing the loss ratio λ(p)µc−p , which is the expected claim amount λ(p)µ over one
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year divided by the annual net premium c − p. In other words, it amounts to
find p that maximizes the implicit safety loading.
Moreover, notice that equations (10) and (11) imply
λ′(p) ≤ −λ(p)
c− p for all p ∈ [0, p
∗
0)], (19)
which yields
λ(p)
λ(0) ≤
c− p
c
for all p ∈ [0, p∗0]. (20)
In words, investing in prevention makes sense as long as the claim frequency
decreases more than the premium rate.
It is also interesting to remark that p∗0 can be found with a geometric construc-
tion. Indeed, Equation (11) shows that the tangent line of the function λ(.) at
point p∗0 passes through the point (c, 0), as illustrated in Figure 1.
2.1.1 Adjustment coefficient
In this section, we assume that the moment generating function MX(.) for the
claim amount is well defined. Namely, we assume that
MX(s) <∞ for all s ∈ R (21)
or that there exists s∗ > 0 such that
MX(s) <∞ for all s < s∗ and MX(s) =∞ for all s ≥ s∗. (22)
For all p ∈ D, we denote by κ(p) the adjustment coefficient defined as the
positive solution of the equation
λ(p) + (c− p)s = λ(p)MX(s). (23)
The adjustment coefficient is thus well defined regardless of the prevention
amount.
It is well known that if the adjustment coefficient exists, inequality 1−ϕ(u, p) ≤
e−κ(p)u holds true, which means that the ruin probability decreases exponen-
tially with the initial surplus, the adjustment coefficient controlling the slope of
the decrease. Therefore, the adjustment coefficient can be seen as an indicator
of the initial surplus efficiency in reducing the ruin probability.
A prevention amount can be defined as optimal if it maximizes the adjustment
coefficient of the insurance company. The next result shows that this optimal
prevention amount coincides with the one that maximes the non-ruin proba-
bility. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 which highlights the fact
that maximizing the non-ruin probability with respect to p amounts to find p
maximizing the implicit safety loading.
9
Figure 2: Geometric construction to find the optimal prevention amount (with
c = 10)
Corollary 2.
If Equation (10) holds, then p∗0 maximizes the function κ(.).
Proof. Let p ∈ D. Equation (23) can be rewritten as
1 + (c− p)s
λ(p) =MX(s). (24)
Geometrically, Equation (24) tells us that the adjustment coefficient is the point
where the line passing through (0,1) with slope (c−p)λ(p) crosses the moment gen-
erating function MX(.), as depicted in Figure 3. So, one can see that the ad-
justment coefficient increases with the drift of the surplus process U(t, p). Let
us now change the time scale to obtain the surplus process described in (17).
Of course, the adjustment coefficient is not impacted by such a transformation.
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Figure 3: Geometric construction of κ(p)
Now, if we compare the drifts of surplus processes (17) and (15), one sees by
Equation (18) that p∗0 leads to the largest drift for (17) (which corresponds in
that case to the drift of (15)) and hence maximizes κ(.).
Hence, the prevention amount that maximizes the adjustment coefficient is
equivalent to the prevention amount that minimizes the ruin probability.
2.1.2 Dividends
In 1957, De Finetti introduced a dividend parameter in the classical Cramer-
Lundberg model [DF57]. In this paper, we consider the case of a constant
dividend barrier as explored by Segerdahl [Seg70] and Dickson and Gray [DG84],
among others.
Denote the constant dividend barrier level by K > u. When the surplus process
hits K, it remains constant until a new claim happens and dividends are being
transferred to shareholders. We denote by Lt the total amount of dividends
distributed up to time t. In such a setting, ruin occurs almost surely.
In Segerdahl [Seg70], we can find an expression for the probability of being
ruined before reaching dividend barrier K, which is
ξ(u,K, p) = ϕ(K, p)− ϕ(u, p)
ϕ(K, p) . (25)
From that expression, we can easily obtained an expression for the expected
amount of dividends earned before being ruined, namely
E(Lt)(p) =
(1− ξ(u,K, p))(c− p)
λ(p)θ , (26)
where θ =
∫K
0 ξ(K − x,K, p)dFX(x). We are now in position to prove the
following result, where we use the same change of time than in the proof of
Proposition (1).
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Corollary 3. The function E(Lt)(.) reaches its maximum in p∗0.
Proof. Let u < K ∈ R+ and p ∈ D. Using the same change of time than in
(17) and comparing again the deterministic parts of the surplus processes (17)
and (15), one easily sees that p∗0 minimizes the function ξ(u,K, .).
Now, combining (25) and (26), we get
E(Lt)(p) =
ϕ(u, p)∫K
0 1− ϕ(K − x, p)dFX(x)
c− p
λ(p) . (27)
We have seen in the proof of Proposition 1 that p∗0 maximizes c−pλ(p) . Furthermore,
we also know by Proposition 1 that p∗0 maximizes ϕ(u, p) and therefore minimizes∫K
0 1− ϕ(K − x, p)dFX(x) as well, which ends the proof.
Thus, p∗0 introduced in Proposition 1 is also the prevention amount that maxi-
mizes the expected amount of dividends.
2.1.3 Impact of c on p∗0
We denote the optimal prevention amount by p∗0(c) to make explicit the depen-
dence with the premium rate c and we investigate the impact of c on p∗0(c). We
get the following result.
Proposition 4. If condition (10) is fulfilled, then p∗0(.) increases with c.
Proof. Recalling Equation (11),
p∗0(c) = c+
λ(p∗0(c))
λ′(p∗0(c))
(28)
yields
p∗0
′(c) = λ
′(p∗0(c))2
λ′′(p∗0(c))λ(p∗0(c))
> 0. (29)
Equation (29) guarantees that p∗0(.) increases with c.
So, if the insurer gets a higher premium amount, it is always optimal to invest
a part of this premium increase for prevention. In the extreme case where the
premium rate c goes to infinity, the next result shows that p∗0(c) tends to infinity
as well.
Proposition 5.
We have lim
c→∞ p
∗
0(c) = +∞. Furthermore,
(i) If lim
c→∞λ
′(c)c 6= 0, then lim
c→∞
p∗0(c)
c 6= 0;
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(ii) If lim
c→∞λ
′(c)c = 0 and lim
c→∞λ(c) > 0, then limc→∞
p∗0(c)
c = 0;
(iii) If lim
c→∞λ(c) = 0, then limc→∞
p∗0(c)
c = 0 if and only if limc→∞
λ(c)−λ′(c)c
λ(c) = 1.
Proof. Let us first prove that lim
c→∞ p
∗
0(c) = +∞. Equation (11) can be rewritten
as
p∗0(c)
c
= λ(p
∗
0(c))
λ′(p∗0(c))c
+ 1, (30)
where c ∈ R+ is such that the safety loading condition is fulfilled. Because
0 ≤ p∗0(c)c < 1, we know that λ(p
∗
0(c))
λ′(p∗0(c))c
is bounded.
Let us assume that lim
c→∞ p
∗
0(c) = α ∈ R+. We have λ′(α) < 0 since λ(.) is a
decreasing function. It comes
lim
c→∞
p∗0(c)
c
= 1 + lim
c→∞
λ(p∗0(c))
λ′(p∗0(c))c
= 1 (31)
as lim
c→∞
λ(p∗0(c))
λ′(p∗0(c))c
= lim
c→∞
λ(α)
λ′(α)c = 0. Now, since limc→∞ p
∗
0(c) = α, we also get
that lim
c→∞
p∗0(c)
c = 0, which contradicts our previous result. Hence, as p∗0(.) is an
increasing function, we necessarily have lim
c→∞ p
∗
0(c) = +∞.
Let us now turn to items (i)-(iii). Since p∗0(.) is strictly increasing, the inverse
function p∗−10 (.) exists. Hence, Equation (30) evaluated in p∗−10 (c) gives
p∗−10 (c) = c−
λ(c)
λ′(c) . (32)
Obviously, we have lim
c→∞ p
∗−1
0 (c) = +∞, so that limc→∞
λ(p∗0(c))
λ′(p∗0(c))c
exists and is equal
to l if and only if
lim
c→∞
λ(c)
λ′(c)p∗−10 (c)
= lim
c→∞
λ(c)
λ′(c)c− λ(c) = l. (33)
Moreover, by assumption on λ(.), we know that lim
c→∞λ(c) = l1.
In a first time, let us assume that l1 > 0. Since 0 ≤ p
∗
0(c)
c < 1, Equation (30)
directly yields lim
c→∞λ
′(p∗0(c))c 6= 0. Furthermore, Equation (29) leads to
(λ′(p∗0(c))c)′ = λ′(p∗0(c))
[
1 + λ
′(p∗0(c))c
λ(p∗0(c))
]
> 0 (34)
since λ(.) is decreasing and condition 0 ≤ p∗0(c)c < 1 is equivalent to
λ′(p∗0(c))c
λ(p∗0(c))
< −1. (35)
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Thus, λ′(p∗0(c))c is negative and increases with c. Therefore, there exists l2 < 0
such that lim
c→∞λ
′(p∗0(c))c = l2, which in turn implies that lim
c→∞
p∗0(c)
c = 1 +
l1
l2
.
Hence, from Equation (33), one sees that we have l2 = −l1 if and only if
lim
c→∞λ
′(c)c = 0, which proves item (ii). Also this proves item (i) in the case
where l1 > 0.
In a second time, let us assume that l1 = 0 in order to end the proof for item (i)
and to prove item (iii). We learn from Equation (33) that if
lim
c→∞λ
′(c)c 6= 0, then we have l = 0 and lim
c→∞
p∗0(c)
c = 1, which ends the proof
of item (i). Finally, turning to item (iii), we know that if lim
c→∞
λ(c)−λ′(c)c
λ(c) = 1,
then there exists c∗ ∈ R such that for all c > c∗, one has λ(c) − λ′(c)c > 0.
Hence, lim
c→∞
λ(c)−λ′(c)c
λ(c) = 1 is equivalent to limc→∞
λ(c)
λ′(c)c−λ(c) = −1, so that from
Equations (31) and (33), one sees that lim
c→∞
λ(c)−λ′(c)c
λ(c) = 1 is equivalent to
lim
c→∞
p∗0(c)
c = 0.
Notice that the case lim
c→∞λ(c) = 0 is of practical relevance if one thinks about
vaccination campaigns for instance. Indeed, in this setting, investing enough
money in prevention to vaccinate the entire population will enable one to erad-
icate the associated disease, as it was the case for the smallpox virus.
Remark 6. When lim
c→+∞{(λ(c) − limc→+∞λ(c))c} exists
1 (which is generally true
in our setting), condition lim
c→∞λ
′(c)c 6= 0 cannot be fulfilled. Indeed, let us show
that the existence of lim
c→+∞{(λ(c)− limc→+∞λ(c))c} necessarily implies limc→+∞λ
′(c)c =
0. Notice that since λ′(c) ≤ 0, we get lim
c→+∞λ
′(c)c ≤ 0 when it exists.
In a first time, we consider the case where lim
c→+∞λ(c) = 0.We have
λ′(c)c = (λ(c)c)′ − λ(c). (36)
One distinguish two situations. Firstly, we suppose that lim
c→∞λ(c)c = +∞.
Hence, we cannot find a constant c˜ such that λ(c)c is decreasing on [c˜,+∞[.
However, if lim
c→+∞λ
′(c)c < 0, then Equation (36) leads to lim
c→+∞(λ(c)c)
′ < 0,
which contradicts the previous sentence. Thus, we necessarily have lim
c→+∞λ
′(c)c =
0. Secondly, we assume that lim
c→∞λ(c)c = γ ≥ 0. Since for all c > 0, we have
λ(c)c =
∫ c
0 (λ(x)x)
′dx and lim
c→∞(λ(c)c)
′ = 0, one sees that Equation (36) yields
lim
c→+∞λ
′(c)c = 0.
1including here the case where lim
c→+∞
{(λ(c)− lim
c→+∞
λ(c))c} = +∞
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In a second time, we consider the case where lim
c→+∞λ(c) = β > 0. Let
λ2(c) = λ(c)− β. (37)
One sees that λ2(.) is decreasing, convex, C2 and such that lim
c→+∞λ2(c) = 0. The
assumptions on λ(.) implies that lim
c→+∞λ2(c)c exists. Applying the same argu-
ments to λ2(.) than in the first case leads to
lim
c→+∞λ
′
2(c)c = 0, which in turn implies that lim
c→+∞λ
′(c)c = 0 by deriving Equa-
tion (37).
Remark 7. Equation (11) tells us that p∗0 does not depend on µ while the
non-ruin probability does. If the claim amounts are exponentially distributed,
so that their distribution is entirely characterized by its mean, then we have
∂
ϕ(u,p∗0)
ϕ(u,0) −1
∂ µ > 0, which means that prevention is still important when you deal
with claim amounts that are higher in average. Indeed, in the exponential case,
the non-ruin probability writes
ϕ(u, p) = 1− λ(p)µ
c− p e
−( 1µ−λ(p)c−p )u (38)
for all u > 0 and p ∈ [0, plim], so that
∂ϕ(u, p)
∂µ
= −
(
1 + u
µ
)
λ(p)
c− pe
−
(
1
µ−λ(p)c−p
)
u
. (39)
Now, as ∂
ϕ(u,p∗0)
ϕ(u,0) −1
∂µ =
∂ϕ(u,p∗0)
∂µ ϕ(u,0)− ∂ϕ(u,0)∂µ ϕ(u,p∗0)
ϕ2(u,0) , Equation (39) leads to
∂
ϕ(u,p∗0)
ϕ(u,0) − 1
∂µ
=
(
1 + uµ
)
ϕ2(u, 0)
(
λ(0)
c
e
−
(
1
µ−λ(0)c
)
u − λ(p
∗
0)
c− p∗0
e
−
(
1
µ−
λ(p∗0)
c−p∗0
)
u
)
. (40)
Therefore, since λ(p
∗
0)
c−p∗0 <
λ(0)
c by definition of p∗0, it comes
∂
ϕ(u,p∗0)
ϕ(u,0) −1
∂µ > 0, as
previously announced.
2.2 Surplus expectancy
An insurance company may also want to maximize its expected surplus on a
given time horizon t, which amounts to find the prevention amount maximizing
the expectation of U(t), denoted p˜ in the following.
Obviously, we have
E(U(t))(p) = u+ [c− p− λ(p)µ]t. (41)
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Hence, by deriving (41) with respect to p, we easily see that the optimal pre-
vention amount p˜ is positive if and only if −λ′(0) > 1µ . In such a case, p˜ solves
−λ′(p˜) = 1
µ
. (42)
This time, the optimal prevention amount p˜ is different from p∗0. One sees that p˜
does not depend on the premium rate c but well on the expected claim amount
µ. As a consequence, an insurance company has to make a choice between
maximizing its expected wealth on a given time horizon and decreasing its risk
on the long run.
Note that this particular optimisation result provides an additional way to
demonstrate that, as stated in the introduction, the present problem differs
from the optimal reinsurance problem: in the proportional reinsurance context
where the surplus process is given by
V (t, α) = u+ (c− α(1 + θ)γµ)t−
Nγ(t)∑
i=1
Xi, (43)
as in Equation (8), maximizing the expected surplus at the end of the first
period leads to maximizing
u+ c− γµ(1 + αθ),
which is achieved for α = 0 as long as θ > 0.
In the sequel, we focus our study on the optimal prevention amount p∗0.
3 λ(.) constant then decreasing
Assuming λ(p) decreasing with p can be too restrictive in practice. Indeed, as
mentioned in the introduction, we can have situations where we must at least
invest a certain amount P in prevention to start to observe an impact on λ(.).
That is why, in this section, we consider the case where λ(.) is first constant for
prevention amounts smaller than a certain threshold P . Beyond P , λ(.) is still
assumed to be decreasing and strictly convex.
Formally, let 0 < P < c and let
λ : [0, c] 7−→ R+
p 7−→ λ(0) if p ≤ P
λ(p) < λ(0) otherwise.
Moreover, for all p ≥ P , we suppose λ ∈ C2, λ′(p) < 0 and λ′′(p) > 0.
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We look for the prevention amount p∗0 maximizing ϕ(0, p) = 1 − λ(p)µc−p . The
reasoning is conducted in two steps. Firstly, we look for the optimal prevention
amount p∗ on the interval [P, plim[, where prevention is useful. Secondly, we
compare the ruin probability obtained by investing this amount in prevention
with the one obtained without prevention.
Proposition 8. If condition c−p∗c λ(0) > λ(p∗) is verified, then we have p∗0 = p∗.
Otherwise, we have p∗0 = 0.
Proof. In a first time, we consider p ∈ [P, plim]. In this case, λ(.) verifies all the
assumptions stated in Section 2 and condition (10) becomes
−λ′(P )− λ(P )
c− P > 0. (44)
Thus, when condition (44) is fulfilled, Propositions 1 and ?? tell us that p∗ does
not depend on u and is given by p∗ = c + λ(p∗)
λ′(p∗) . Otherwise, if (44) is not
verified, it comes p∗ = P and hence p∗0 = 0.
In a second time, when condition (44) is fulfilled, we have to compare ϕ(0, 0)
and ϕ(0, p∗). It comes
ϕ(0, 0)− ϕ(0, p∗) < 0 ⇔ −λ(0)µc + λ(p
∗)µ
c−p∗ < 0
⇔ c−p∗c λ(0) > λ(p∗).
Hence, if condition c−p∗c λ(0) > λ(p∗) holds true, then we have p∗0 = p∗. Other-
wise, we have p∗0 = 0.
Let us notice that condition c−p∗c λ(0) > λ(p∗) is closed to (10). It can be
rewritten as λ(p∗)λ(0) <
c−p∗
c , such that investing p∗ must decrease more the claim
frequency than the premium rate. Moreover, the proofs of Proposition 1 and
Corollaries 2 and 3 can easily be adapted to this section.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, a first risk model with prevention has been introduced. The opti-
mal prevention strategies have been identified for several optimisation problems.
In further works, it would be interesting to consider different impacts of preven-
tion for different categories of claims. The uncertainty on prevention efficiency,
its evolution over time, as well as the impact of impulses of prevention strate-
gies (represented by an instantaneous, one-shot drop in the surplus instead of
a steady prevention effort which decreases the premium income rate) could be
taken into account. It would also be interesting to consider optimal preven-
tion as a stochastic control problem, and to jointly use optimal prevention and
reinsurance. This is left for further research.
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